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EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT, AND "THIS KIND OF 
SPEECH": A HERETICAL 
PERSPECT~VE ON HUSTLER 
MAGAZINE V. FALWELL 
PAUL A. LEBEL'" 
In August 1986, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed a $200,000 judgment for the Reverend 
Jerry Falwell on his claim against Hustler Magazine and its publisher, 
Larry Flynt, for the tort of the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 1 The lawsuit arose out of the publication of an "ad parody," 
published in the November 1983 and March 1984 issues of Hustler, 
purporting to contain an interview with plaintiff Falwell in which he 
recounted, among other things, escapades such as sexual relations with 
his mother in an outhouse and drunkenness. 2 Falwell had been unsuc-
cessful on two other tort claims arising out of the same incident: the 
jury found against Falwell on a libel claim,3 and an invasion of privacy 
claim had been dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff's claim did 
not fall within the scope of the limited invasion of privacy tort action 
for appropriation of a person's name or likeness that Virginia state law 
recognized.4 
• Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Work on this article was assisted by a re-
search grant from the Marshall-Wythe Law School Foundation. The author wishes to thank Frederick 
Schauer and Rodney Smolla for their comments on the article. The author is also grateful to Alexander 
Wellford and David Kohler, of the Richmond, Virginia firm of Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent & Chap-
pell, who acted as counsel for various amici in the Falwell case, for the opportunity to participate in a 
"moot court" session with the Hustler/Flynt attorneys prior to the Supreme Court argument. That 
exposure heightened the author's appreciation of the issues in Falwell, but in no way reduced his 
amazement at the result. 
I. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, reh'g and reh'g en bane denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986), 
rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). Falwell had also sued Flynt Dis-
tributing Company, the magazine's distributor, but the jury returned a verdict for that defendant. [d. 
2. [d. at 1272. 
3. The jury concluded that "no reasonable man would believe that the parody was describing 
actual facts about Falwell." [d. at 1273. The significance of this finding is discussed infra notes 105-06 
and accompanying text. 
4. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273. Restrictively interpreting the Virginia "appropriation of name or 
likeness" statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1984), the district court dismissed the plaintiffs claim on 
the basis that the appropriation of Falwell's name "was not for purposes of trade within the meaning of 
the statute." 797 F.2d at 1273. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that dismissal, adding as another ground 
for the decision the adoption of a new requirement for finding liability. To find liability under this 
requirement, the use of a public figure's name "must take such a form that the reader would reasonably 
315 
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Despite the United States Supreme Court's reversal of the 
Fourth Circuit's decision in favor of Falwell,5 the Court has not satis-
factorily addressed many of the most significant legal issues that were 
raised by the dispute. The issues presented to the Court were, first, 
whether the first amendment places constraints on a state's tort law 
permitting the recovery of damages for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and second, if the first amendment does so, what is 
the nature of those constitutional constraints.6 
The Court instead appeared to be distracted by a hypothetical 
question along the lines of whether a publisher such as The Washing-
ton Post should be liable for the emotional discomfort of a public figure 
intentionally caused by a publication such as a Herblock editorial car-
toon. 7 Stating that he could find no principled basis on which to dis-
tinguish a case of that sort from the case that was actually before the 
Court,S Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for seven of the Justices,9 
concluded that Falwell could not maintain an action for damages for 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress without proof that a 
• 
believe the falsification." Id. at 1278. Given the jury's finding that such a belief was not reasonable, 
supra note 3, Falwell's invasion of privacy claim failed to satisfy this new test. 
S. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S.Ct. 876 (1988). 
6. The Court's opinion stated: 
We must decide whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused 
by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in 
the eyes of most. Respondent would have us find that a State's interest in protecting public 
figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech 
that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury. 
Id. at 879 (emphasis added). 
As this article demonstrates, there is an important distinction between deciding that the tort claim 
at issue on appeal is subject to some first amendment restrictions and deciding that the constitutional 
protections developed in the defamation context should be transferred virtually intact to this very dif-
ferent setting. See generally part II, infra. 
7. The Chief Justice's opinion traces the history and remarks favorably on the importance of 
political cartooning. 108 S. Ct. at 881. That history is set out in an amicus brief filed on behalf of The 
Association of American Editorial Cartoonists. The jeopardy in which political cartooning is alleged to 
have been placed by the judgment for Falwell is described in that brief, Brief for Amicus Curiae, The 
Association of American Editorial Cartoonists at 20-30, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 
(1988), as well as in Judge Wilkinson's opinion dissenting from the Fourth Circuit's denial of rehearing 
en bane, Falwell v. Flynt, 80S F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1986). 
8. 108 S. Ct. at 881 (expressing doubt that there is "a principled standard" to separate the publi-
cation in the Falwell case from "more traditional political cartoons"). 
9. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the Falwell decision. Justice White concurred in the 
judgment, in a cryptic opinion in which he agreed that liability could not "be squared with the First 
Amendment." Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring in judgment). He did not, however, explain his reasons 
for that conclusion. For a discussion of Justice White's concurring opinion, see infra notes 90-91 and 
accompanying text. 
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false statement of fact had been made with "actual malice,"IO and ac-
cordingly set aside the lower court judgment in Falwell's favor. II 
Unable to offer any convincing general characterization of what 
sort of speech the Court had before it, the Chief Justice's opinion re-
ferred vaguely, and not very helpfully, to the nondefamatory refer-
ences to Falwell as "publications such as the one here at issue."12 The 
opinion also too lightly dismissed the defendant's conduct as involving 
simply "the publication of an ad parody offensive to"13 the plaintiff. 
In failing to convey an understanding of the precise issue, the Court 
was unable to provide much in the Way of guidance for the conduct of 
future litigation, other than a fact-specific rejection of liability imposed 
on some indeterminate category of "this kind of speech." 14 
This article examines the relationship between the tort of the in-
tentional iQ.fliction of emotional distress and the first amendment, and 
concludes that the emotional distress tort claim should retain a more 
expanded role than the Supreme Court's Falwell decision appears to 
leave it. The route to such a conclusion requires tracing state tort law 
as it has been constitutionalized in other free-speech contexts and 
identifying the significant differences between the other torts that are 
restricted by the first amendment and the emotional distress tort claim 
asserted by Falwell. The article will offer an alternative method of 
constitutionalizing the emotional distress tort that adequately protects 
first amendment interests without resorting to the Falwell case's deni-
gration of the importance or the legitimacy of the personal interests 
protected by this tort action. 
This article could be subtitled a concurring rather than a dissent-
ing opinion. It reflects the author's judgment that, applying, the ele-
10. 108 S. Ct. at 882. The term "actual malice" refers to the publisher's state of mind of either 
knowing that the publication is false or displaying reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. See New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). Taken from the context of constitutionallimita-
tions on liability for defamation, the term here was applied in such a way as to add to the emotional 
distress tort a requirement that the publication alleged to have caused such distress must contain a 
false statement of fact about which the "actual malice" could be entertained. For a critical discussion 
of the way in which this application results in a distortion of the tort claim before the Court, see infra 
notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
II. 108 S. Ct. at 883. The Court concluded that Falwell's claim could not, consistent "with the 
First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages when the conduct in question is the publica-
tion of a caricature such as the ad parody involved here." [d. 
12. [d. at 882 (emphasis added). The Court also referred to the publication before it as "an 
offensive publication," id. at 880, and "a caricature such as the ad parody involved here," id. at 883. As 
this article explains, the Court was on the right track in its references to "debate about public affairs," 
id. at 880, and "public debate about public figures," id. at 881. 
13. [d. at 879. 
14. The phrase "this kind of speech" is not actually used by the Court, but has been chosen by the 
author to capture the fact-specificity of the Court's opinion. The closest the Court comes to the phrase 
is the reference to "the sort of expression involved in this case." [d. at 882. 
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ments of this constitutionally acceptable emotional distress tort to the 
Falwell facts, the plaintiff's victory in the lower courts could not be 
allowed to stand. The Court's flawed or incomplete reasoning in 
reaching the proper result should not preclude further attention to the 
relationship between the first amendment and the emotional distress 
action. It is particularly important for the decision of later cases that 
the ambiguities and uncertainties generated by the Court's Falwell 
opinion be replaced with a clear understanding not only of why the 
decision in that case was correct, but also of what room remains for 
the successful assertion of the emotional distress claim. 
The title's characterization of the perspective adopted in this arti-
cle as "heretical" stems from the author's sense that there is an ortho-
doxy in libel law practice and scholarship today. Its proponents 
zealously protect media interests and are quick to denounce depar-
tures from the true faith as "anti-first amendment."ls They seem 
never to have encountered an absolute privilege they didn't like, nor a 
qualified privilege that shouldn't be extended. The harm inflicted by 
speech is seldom regarded by the orthodox view as significant enough 
to warrant compensation. Indeed, any prospect of tort liability is seen 
as an intolerable threat to first amendment values. Given the Chief 
Justice's previous position as one of the principal opponents of this 
conventional view,16 it is ironic that the opinion for the Court in 
Falwell serves as something of a model of orthodox thinking about 
whether, and if so, how, the first amendment ought to affect novel 
issues. 
This article admittedly comes at the issues presented by Falwell 
from a perspective different from the contemporary mainstream. Its 
author, however, would resist the suggestion that his "heretical" views 
on' how the first amendment places limits on tort claims necessarily 
makes him an apostate from the belief in the importance of freedom of 
15. For reactions to this view, see LeBel, The Good. The Bad. and The Press (Book Review), 1986 
DUKE LJ. \074. See generally Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 COR· 
NELL L. REV. 302 (1984); Nagel, How to Stop Libel Suits and Still Protect Individual Reputation, 
WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1985, at 12. 
16. See. e.g .. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 268 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting 
from decision requiring courts to apply clear and convincing evidence standard of proof to motions for 
summary judgment in cases to which that standard applies); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 
U.S. 770 (1984) (opinion by Rehnquist, J., noting the state's interest in protecting its citizens from the 
deception caused by defamatory statements); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (opinion by 
Rehnquist, J., applying test of public figure status and clarifying the fact that reputational injury is not 
a prerequisite to recovery for defamation). 
The fact that the decision in Falwell was written by the Chief Justice might produce either skepti· 
cism or amazement at an apparent conversion. Resistance to the temptation to adopt a skeptical atti· 
tude is suggested in Smolla, Emotional Distress and The First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. 
Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 438 (1988). 
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speech. Instead, as described below, the "heresy" consists of the belief 
that harm caused by speech is not necessarily less serious and less de-
serving of compensation than harm caused in other ways and that 
speech interests do not always outweigh the individual interests of vic-
tims of harmful speech. The protection of individual interests should 
be accommodated with first amendment values whenever it is possible 
to do so. 
The celebrity of the parties to the Falwell litigation and the ob-
noxiousness of their conduct on this and other occasions,17 as well as 
the temptation to portray the litigation as a momentous cultural bat-
tle,18 create a risk of obscuring the essential simplicity of the Falwell 
case. An understanding of what was at stake in this litigation can be 
derived from a consideration of three questions. First, should a tort 
plaintiff be able to evade the constitutional restrictions imposed on lia-
bility for defamation by attaching the label of a different tort theory to 
the same course of conduct that would have supported a defamation 
claim? Second, if the answer to the first question is in the negative, 
should the constitutional restrictions on recovery for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress be transferred intact from the current 
law of defamation? Third, if the second question is answered in the 
negative, what sort of constitutional limits on the emotional distress 
action are appropriate? 
Part I of this article will consider the first two questions, showing' 
that a negative answer is the only plausible conclusion. The critical 
question then becomes what constitutional restrictions ought to be im-
posed on the ability to obtain a tort recovery for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Part II of the article examines the answers 
to that question offered by the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court 
in Falwell and explains why each of those answers is considerably less 
than compelling. In part III, the article will set out a scheme of con-
stitutional protection for those whose speech is subject to attack under 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort theory. That pro-
ject will consist of three steps: first,· outlining the moral basis for im-
posing liability for the kind of tortious conduct that can be 
characterized as the intentional infliction of emotional distress; sec-
ond, explaining how this (admittedly wide-sweeping) moral notion can 
17, A few years ago, the author referred to the Falwell/Flynt litigation 'IS the legal equivalent of 
the Army·Navy game, to which the only reasonable response is to wish for each team to suffer a 
humiliating defeat LeBel, The Infliction of Harm Through the Publication of Fiction: Fashioning a 
Theory of Liability, 51 BROOKLYN L REV, 281, 306 n,96 (1985), Perhaps the more contemporary 
analogy would have been the Iran·Iraq war, 
18, See R, SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V, LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL 
24·27 (1988). 
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be incorporated into the existing structure of the intentional emotional 
distress action; and third, identifying the elements of the tort action 
that lend themselves to serving as the hooks upon which can be hung a 
carefully-tailored constitutional protection from liability for this tort. 
I. EXTENDING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION INTO A NEW 
TORT ARENA 
Recognition of an action for the recovery of damages for emo-
tional distress distinct from compensation for a physical injury has 
developed largely by indirection and fairly arbitrary line drawing. Cit-
ing concerns about fraudulent claims, a flood of administratively diffi-
cult cases, and liability greatly disproportionate to culpability, courts 
have routinely insisted on the satisfaction of some tangible or readily 
identifiable prerequisite to the recovery for emotional distress. 19 
Viewed from the long-term perspective of the development of common 
law emotional distress actions, the Supreme Court's Falwell foray into 
the emotional distress field is simply another inadequate attempt to 
create barriers to recovery, although on this occasion the rationales for 
those barriers are matters of constitutional significance rather than 
nonconstitutional policy concerns. 
The modern and most widely adopted version of the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress was published in 1948 as a sup-
plement to the Restatement of Torts.20 In its standard, recognized 
form,21 and as adopted in Virginia,22 the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress tort action requires the plaintiff to prove four major 
elements: 
first, that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly;23 
19. The arbitrariness of the lines drawn at different stages in the development of a negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress tort is traced in Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted 
Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982). 
20. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 46 (Supp. 1948): "One who, without a privilege to do so, 
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such emotional distress, and (b) 
for bodily harm resulting from it." Prior to the adoption of that amendment, the Restatement re-
stricted recovery either to a situation that would be covered by a traditional intentional tort action, or 
to one that would constitute the negligent infliction of bodily harm as a result of an intentional interfer-
ence with mental tranquility. See generally State Rubbish. Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 
240 P.2d 282 (1952). The history and the paradigmatic applications of the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress tort are described in Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits 
of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 42 (1982). 
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). Unless specified otherwise, subsequent 
references in the text and in the footnotes to the "RESTATEMENT" are to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS (1965, 1977, 1979). 
22. See Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974). 
23. To avoid any ambiguity, the intent element of this tort claim should be interpreted as requir-
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second, that the defendant's conduct can be characterized as ex-
treme and outrageous;24 
third, that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the 
harm that the plaintiff suffered;25 and 
fourth, that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress.26 
321 
The relationship between the general category of conduct ad-
dressed by the emotional distress action and the kind of activity pro-
tected as part of the relevant first amendment freedoms frequently is 
fairly close. Unlike the tort of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, which usually is tied to the creation of a risk of physical injury to 
the plaintiff27 or to a third party,2s the elements of the intentional emo-
tional distress claim typically are satisfied by activity that is either ex-
clusively or predominantly speech.29 For example, a claim for relief 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has been recognized 
in situations in which a defendant has communicated threats to the 
plaintiff,30 has insulted the plaintiff,31 or has accomplished both in one 
communication.32 Communications involving debt collection33 or sex-
ing an intent to cause severe emotional distress, or recklessness with regard to that distress. Subsequent 
references in the text and the footnotes to the "intent" element of this tort claim are to be understood to 
include recklessness, unless otherwise specified. Proof of intent or recklessness is discussed infra notes 
74-76 and accompanying text. 
24. The language in the text is from the RESTATEMENT, supra note 21. The Virginia version of 
this element of the tort claim states that "the conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offends 
against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Womack, 215 Va. at 342, 210 
S.E.2d at 148. 
25. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21. 
26. [d. 
27. Emotional distress as a result of being within the zone of danger of physical injury from the 
defendant's conduct is one of the more commonly recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress 
actions. See, e.g., Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984). 
28. Bystander recovery by a plaintiff who was not herself subjected to the risk of physical injury 
from defendant's conduct has been recognized in cases such as Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
29. One could attempt to distinguish speech from conduct, and then limit the scope of the emo-
tional distress tort claim to the latter category. The difficulty of drawing that distinction in a meaning-
ful and manageable fashion, ,as well as the presence of both elements in most situations, suggest that the 
exercise is not worth the effort. See Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Serv. v. Missouri Real 
Estate Comm'n, 712 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1986) (disagreement between majority and dissent about use of 
speech/conduct distinction). 
30. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (plaintiff was 
told to accede to union demands or face beating and damage to his property). See generally Pearson, 
supra note 19. 
31. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So: 2d 396 (Fla. 1958) (plaintiff was told "you stink to me" 
by defendant's employee).' 
32. Lipman v. Atlantic Coast LineR.R., 108 S.c. 151,93 S.E. 714 (1917). 
33. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 CaL App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950) (defendant placed a pur-
ported emergency telephone call to plaintift). 
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ual solicitation34 or both35 have also served as the basis of emotional 
distress claims. Practical jokes at the expense of the plaintiff constitute 
another category of communications that can support an emotional 
distress claim.36 
The speech foundation of many, if not most, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claims might lead to an initial assumption that all 
such claims should be subjected to constitutional restrictions. How-
ever, a consideration of a distinction in the kinds of speech that can 
produce emotional distress provides a preliminary classificatory device 
of some utility. The intentional infliction of emotional distress typi-
cally involves communication of something to the plaintiff.37 The kind 
of conduct involved in the Falwell case presents the different matter of 
a communication about the plaintiff. In deciding that the constitution 
places limits on liability for tort claims based on theories of defama-
tion38 and invasion of privacy,39 the Supreme Court has had before it 
only cases involving speech that is primarily about the plaintiff. ' This 
is because the principal tort claims on which the Court had imposed 
constitutional limitations each contained an element requiring com-
munication to someone other than the tort plaintiff.40 
The distinction between speech-to and speech-about can be em-
ployed as the first step in devising a way to determine whether the 
constitutional protection of freedom of speech should restrict tort lia-
bility for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Restrictions 
could be conditioned on a threshold showing that something more 
than speech-to the plaintiff was involved. That threshold would intro-
duce into the emotional distress claim an element similar to the publi-
34. Samms v. Eccles, II Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (repeated telephone calls to plaintiff, 
plus one incident of indecent exposure). 
35. Oigsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948) (offer by debt collector 
to let plaintiff "take it out in trade"). 
36. Wilkinson v. Oownton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897) (false report that plaintiirs husband had been seri-
ously injured in accident). 
37. See supra notes 30-36. 
38. See generally LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An Accommodation of the Competing 
Interests Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 NEB. L. REV. 249, 252-87 (1987) (summary 
of the constitutional restrictions on recovery for defamation). 
39. See. e.g .• Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Cantrell v. Forest City Pub-
lishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
40. The defamation actions for libel ·and slander each require proof of publication, which in the 
defamation context is a term of art meaning communication of the defamatory statement to someone 
other than the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of TORTS § 577 (1977). The invasion of privacy 
torts for placing the plaintiff in a false light and for the public disclosure of private facts each requires 
proof of a more extensive publication element that the RESTATEMENT refers to as "publicity." Id. at 
§§ 6520, 652E. According to the RESTATEMENT, publicity "means that the matter is made public, by 
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as 
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge." Id. at § 6520 comment a. 
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cation element of the defamation and invasion of privacy torts. A 
failure to cross that threshold would indicate that a particular emo-
tional distress claim was distinguishable enough from the other consti-
tutionalized speech torts that constitutional protectiori would not have 
to be afforded the activity causing the emotional distress. In the case 
of pure speech-to, that is, speech that does not reach an audience be-
yond the person to whom it is directed, the "public debate" rationale 
for the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan41 would not be 
implicated, thus leaving the proponent of first amendment protection 
with the burden of providing a plausible alternative reason to impose 
constitutional limitations on liability.42 
As with many supposedly bright-line demarcations between cate-
gories of cases, the speech-to and speech-about characterizations may 
be both weaker and stronger than they initially appear to be. The dis-
tinction would leave unaffected the tort law precedents in such cases as 
bill collector harassment or practical jokes of the false-report-of-an-
injury-to-a-relative ilk. Even those speech-to fact patterns, however, 
are easily susceptible to a modification that brings them within the 
scope of the speech-about characterization. When the collection 
agency calls the plaintitrs place of employment, for example, an im-
plicit negative message about the plaintiff can be conveyed. Similarly, 
the plaintiff whose humiliation in the course of a practical joke occurs 
in public is someone about whom a negative message has at least im-
plicitly been conveyed. 
Because speech to a person may have incidental affects that reach 
a wider audience, the application of any guideline based on the distinc-
tion between speech-to and speech-about may very well have to focus 
on the primary thrust of the communication. Furthermore, a commu-
nication that primarily is speech about a person may reach that per-
son, as was the case of the publication in Hustler which was brought to 
Falwell's attention.43 As long as the limited utility of the speech-tol 
speech-about dichotomy is acknowledged, however, it can serve as a 
useful way to remove from constitutional scrutiny at least some tor-
tious conduct traditionally subject to the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claim. 
41. 376 U.s. 254, 270 (1964) (declaring "a profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"). 
42. The use of other free speech rationales for this purpose is illustrated in R. SMOLLA, supra note 
18. The weakness in those other rationales is related to their inability to identify some unique property 
of speech that identifies it as entitled to special protection from legal responsibility for the harm that it 
causes to another person. See generally F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A .PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 
(1982). 
43. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 1. 
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Assuming that a communication that is primarily speech-to is 
treated as raising no substantial constitutional problems,44 the more 
significant question is whether speech-about is always subject to consti-
tutional protection. As long as it is understood that an affirmative 
answer to that question does not necessarily commit one to any partic-
ular regime of protection, a consideration of the implications of a neg-
ative answer should make it clear that the affirmative answer is 
correct. 
A hallmark of the common law pleading systems from which 
contemporary law has evolved was a hypertechnical insistence on the 
selection of just the right writ and the use of precisely the right lan-
guage with which to plead and prove one's case.45 The question of 
whether a plaintiff should be entitled to recover was sometimes treated 
as secondary to the question of whether the plaintiff exercised the cor-
rect options in the pleading stage of the litigation.46 In such a system, 
a party who deserved compensation could be denied any recovery sim-
ply because of improper pleading technique. 
Modern procedural rules for civil actions are more in tune with 
common sense and fairness in attaching less significance to pleading 
technicalities. Indeed, in some instances, the historically distinct sub-
stantive requirements of different claims for relief have been relaxed in 
ways that make the selection and the availability of a particular tort 
theory less important than those matters might previously have 
been.47 It is against this background, which might be described as a 
commitment to the resolution of disputes on essential rather than pe-
ripheral bases,48 that one should consider the adverse consequences of 
44. The assumption might be more narrowly phrased as one about the type of constitutional prob· 
lem addressed in the Sullivan line of cases, concerning the deterrent effect on speech about matters of 
public concern. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985) 
("every . . . case in which this Court has found constitutional limits to state defamation laws . . . 
involved expression on a matter of undoubted public concern"). 
45. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 133-37 (3d ed. 1985). 
46. See, e.g., Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773). 
47. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (l959), cert. denied, 362 
U.S. 918 (1960). In Martin, the Supreme Court of Oregon relaxed the traditional trespass to land 
requirement that a tangible invading agent was necessary in order to permit a trespass claim to proceed. 
That decision enabled the plaintiff to obtain a larger recovery than would have been obtainable under a 
more plausibly applicable private nuisance theory, due to the longer limitations period associated with 
the trespass action than with nuisance under that state's law. 
48. That this commitment is substantially less than whole· hearted is demonstrated by the vitality 
and manipulability of such justiciability doctrines as the law of standing. See generally Nichol, Re· 
thinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68 (1984). 
It shouid also be noted that the popular perception of many constitutional guarantees, particularly 
in the criminal procedure arena, views them as "technicalities." The argument from essence presented 
in the text is not intended to extend beyond the specific context of the pleading characterization of what 
happened to a plaintiff. 
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conditioning constitutional protection on the particular tort theory the 
plaintiff chooses to pursue. 
In considering how a pleading characterization should affect lia-
bility, one needs to distinguish two types of cases, drawing the distinc-
tion on the basis of their relationship to the defamation action that the 
Supreme Court initially subjected to first amendment limitations. In 
the first situation, the circumstances out of which the claim arose 
would be susceptible to a characterization as involving a defamatory 
publication. In this situation, the plaintiff pleads a different tort the-
ory as an alternative to the defamation theory that would clearly be 
subject to constitutional restrictions of some sort.49 In the second situ-
ation, however, the circumstances out of which the claim arose would 
not lend themselves to a defamation characterization. The pleading of 
a tort theory other than defamation may be the only way in which a 
plaintiff could recover in this situation. 
The first situation, which will be labelled the pleading of a redun-
dant alternative to a defamation claim, presents the easiest case for 
subjecting the nondefamation tort action to constitutional restriction. 
Permitting the plaintiff to select an alternative (nondefamation) theory 
to escape first amendment scrutiny of a claim that would have received 
such scrutiny if pleaded as a defamation action carries with it all the 
arbitrariness and potential for abuse associated with the hypertechni-
o cal forms of action of a discredited age of common law pleading. 50 
The second situation, which will be called a nonevasive alternative, 
may require more in the way of a justification for the imposition of 
constitutional restraints on liability. If this sort of claim is not used 
simply as a way to get around the constitutional barriers that a defa-
mation plaintiff would face, one might question why it should be sub-
ject to constitutional limitations at all. In answering that question, it 
must be emphasized that the focus at this stage of the analysis is only 
on whether there should be any constitutional limitations, and not on 
the very different issue of what the constitutional limitations ought to 
be. 
The successful assertion of tort claims requires proof of a combi-
nation of elements, two of which are crucial for an understanding of 
49. The variety of these situations, with their attendant protections, is described in leBel, supra 
note 38, and in Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytical Primer on the 
Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L. J. 1519 (1987). 
50. The author has previously proposed a reform of the law of defamation that calls for treating 
damages for the emotional distress produced by a defamatory publication as an element of recovery 
that would be just as much an inherent part of the defamation action as the more traditional element of 
damages for injury to reputation. See LeBel, supra note 38, at 297-304. Adoption of that reform would 
make it much easier to identify the occurrence and to administer the litigation of the redundant alterna-
tive tort claim described in the text. 
HeinOnline -- 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 326 1989
326 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
the issue under consideration here. Every tort claim requires both 
some liability-forming conduct on the part of the defendant and some 
particular legally cognizable harm to the plaintiff. These elements can 
be either very general, as in the case of a negligence claim,5! or very 
specific, as is the case for the various intentional torts. 52 In the context 
of a defamation claim, the required liability-forming conduct consists 
of the publication of a statement that is capable of injuring the reputa-
tion of the plaintiff. 53 Reputational harm is not a constitutional pre-
requisite to recovery;54 rather, it is the communication's potential for 
inflicting such harm that is the gravamen of the tort claim for defama-
tion. The first of ,the categories described above, the redundant alter-
native pleading, could be fashioned simply by failing to allege the 
reputational harm potential of the challenged speech, even if that ca-
pacity was demonstrable. Indeed, such a demonstration should suffice 
to bring the nondefamation claim within the scope of the same consti-
tutional restrictions that would be imposed on the defamation claim.5s 
For the reasons that will be described below, 56 that scenario was not 
what was presented in the Falwell situation. 
The compelling argument for sUbjecting even non evasive alterna-
tive tort claims to first amendment scrutiny can be understood if one 
focuses on the characterization of the content of the speech that is 
coincidentally capable of injuring reputation, rather than on the fact 
that reputational injury is a possible result of the speech. Contempo-
rary constitutional limitations on tort liability focus on speech that 
involves "a matter of public concern."57 Precisely what is a matter of 
public concern has not yet been adequately addressed by the Court. 58 
The important point for this analysis is that, however one might deter-
mine what speech involves a matter of public concern, there is no nec-
essary link between that speech and reputational harm. In other 
words, what is critical to the assertion of constitutional protection is the 
51. The liability-forming conduct may be described simply as a failure to exercise reasonable care. 
and the compensable harm is generally any physical injury to the person or the property of the plaintiff. 
52. A claim for the intentional tort of battery. for example. requires liability-forming conduct that 
consists of an intent to inflict a harmful or an offensive contact. or to cause the imminent apprehension 
of such contact. The harm must be either a harmful or an offensive contact. See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13-20 (1965). 
53. See id. at § 559 comment d (1977) ("To be defamatory. it is not necessary that the communi-
cation actually cause harm to another's reputation or deter third persons from associating or dealing 
with him. Its character depends upon its general tendency to have such an effect") (emphasis added). 
54. Time. Inc. v. Firestone. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
55. See supra note 49. 
56. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. 
57. See Dun & Bradstreet. Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders. Inc .• 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Connick v. 
Myers. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
58. See Dun & Bradstreet. 472 U.S. at 785 (Brennan. J .• dissenting). 
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public-issue cont~nt of the speech and not any particular capacity for 
reputational harm. The fact that a nondefamation tort claim does not 
implicate the reputation of a plaintiff is therefore not a compelling rea-
son for that claim to escape constitutional restraint. 
The conclusion called for by the discussion in this section of the 
article is that as long as a tort claim arises out of speech that involves a 
matter of public concern, the rationale for first amendment protection 
is, or at least ought to be, presumptively satisfied. As suggested ear-
lier, however, the nature of that first amendment protection is a matter 
that requires much more careful attention than it has received from 
either of the appellate decisions that have differed on the acceptability 
of the district court judgment for Falwell on the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claim that he asserted against Flynt and Hustler 
Magazine. The next section of the article examines the Fourth Circuit 
and Supreme Court decisions and explains why each was inadequate. 
II. THE LIMITED UTILITY OF THE DEFAMATION EXPERIENCE 
Both the Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Falwell 
drew heavily on the experience developed over two decades in the ap-
plication of first amendment constraints on tort recovery under a defa-
mation theory of liability. Unfortunately, as this section of the article 
demonstrates, that experience is of much more limited utility in fash-
ioning constitutional restrictions on emotional distress tort recovery 
than either of the appellate decisions recognized. Following this sec-
tion's critique of both appellate Falwell decisions, the article will offer 
a different model of the manner in which the first amendment should 
limit recovery under the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
theory. 
This section's disc"ussion of the Falwell decisions proceeds from 
the premise that constitutional protection of the defendants' publica-
tion was necessary to prevent Falwell's recovery. As will be demon-
strated at the beginning of the next section of the article, 59 a plausible 
argument can be made that this premise is flawed, and that the case 
need not have been decided on constitutional grounds. Even if one 
accepts the premise that the first amendment had to be invoked to 
prevent Falwell's recovery, however, the manner in which the appel-
late courts applied first amendment protection to the defendants can 
be criticized in ways that are useful in constructing a different method 
of limiting recovery for emotional distress in speech-about cases.60 Be-
cause the mistakes of the Fourth Circuit appear to influence the 
59. See infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text. 
60. Implicit in this discussion is the earlier distinction between speech-to and speech-about, and 
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Supreme Court's perspective on the case, the court of appeals decision 
will be analyzed first. 
The Fourth Circuit opinion addressed two constitutional argu-
ments asserted by the defendants: first, that recovery was impermissi-
ble without a showing of the "actual malice" required in public 
plaintiff defamation cases;61 and second, that the speech was entitled 
to absolute immunity as an expression of opinion.62 Rejecting both of 
those arguments, the court of appeals concluded that the judgment 
entered on the verdict for the plaintiff was consistent with the first 
amendment. 
The first of the two constitutional arguments raised by the de-
fendants-that the emotional distress plaintiff must prove "actual mal-
ice"-requires more attention than the other, because it was in their 
treatment of that argument that the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court reached different but equally erroneous conclusions in Falwell. 
The Fourth Circuit followed a simple reasoning process in order to 
arrive at its conclusion that the plaintiff did not have to prove the 
"actual malice" initially demanded in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van. 63 In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a public official plain-
tiff could not recover damages for defamatory statements about his 
official conduct unless those statements were proved by clear and con-
vincing evidence to have been made with knowledge that they were 
false or with reckless disregard of whether they were true or false. 
"Actual malice" was the label selected by the Court for the fault ele-
ment imposed on public official defamation plaintiffs,64 and subse-
quently extended to plaintiffs characterized as public figures. 65 
In Falwell, the Fourth Circuit decided that: (1) the significance of 
the Sullivan case was its transformation of libel from a strict liability 
to a high culpability tort;66 (2) the tort of intenJional infliction of emo-
tional distress already included a high level of culpability as a neces-
sary element;67 and therefore (3) the culpability requirement contained 
the application of constitutional restraints only to recovery for the latter. See supra notes 37-46 and 
accompanying text. 
61. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986). 
62. Id. at 1273-74. 
63. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
64. Id. at 280. 
65. See generally LeBel, supra note 38, at 254-59. 
66. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986) ("When applied to a defamation action, 
the actual malice standard alters none of the elements of the tort; it merely increases the level of fault 
the plaintiff must prove"). 
67. Id. ("The first of the four elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress ... [inten-
tional or reckless misconduct] is precisely the level of fault that New York Times requires in an action 
for defamation") (emphasis added). 
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in the prima facie case for an intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claim provided the protection to the defendants that the Consti-
tution had previously been found to demand in the libel context. 68 
While the reasoning process used by the court may appear to be valid, 
careful reflection reveals that the process is built on faulty premises. 
The court of appeals opinion attaches undue significance to the 
level of culpability that was declared in the Sullivan line of cases to be 
a constitutional prerequisite to recovery on a defamation claim by a 
public official or public figure plaintiff.69 Finding that same level of 
culpability in the emotional distress action,70 the court reaches the 
dual conclusion that the kind of culpability required by Sullivan need 
not be proven in an emotional distress action and that the proof of the 
emotional distress action's kind of culpability serves the same constitu-
tional protection function as the Sullivan "actual malice" requirement. 
The first of those conclusions, despite the Supreme Court's rejection of 
it,?! is arguably correct, but for reasons other than those relied on by 
the Fourth Circuit. The second conclusion is incorrect, and provides 
an opportunity to begin reshaping the constitutional protection af-
forded to an emotional distress defendant. 
The significance of the Sullivan line of cases extends beyond the 
mere fact that a heightened fault requirement was attached to what 
had traditionally been a strict liability tort claim. Of much greater 
significance is the type of fault that was adopted as a constitutional 
prerequisite to recovery. "Actual malice" is a state of mind that dis-
plays fault regarding the truth or falsity of the communication. The 
Supreme Court tailored this type of fault element to meet the specific 
concerns that were implicated by the finding of liability in the lower 
courts in the Sullivan case. Of special concern was the possibility that 
liability for innocent misstatements of fact would make the publisher 
the guarantor of the accuracy of what was said, which in turn would 
create a climate in which the publication of important statements 
would be "chilled" if the accuracy of those statements could not easily 
be guaranteed by their publisher.72 In order to reduce the deterrence 
to publication posed by an application of the tort law rules applied by 
the state courts in Sullivan, the Supreme Court decided that liability 
could only be imposed on a defendant who had been proven by clear 
68. Id. ("We ... hold that when the first amendment requires application of the actual malice 
standard, the standard is met when the jury finds that the defendant's intentional or reckless miscon-
duct has proximately caused the injury complained of"). 
69. See supra note 65. 
70. See supra note 66. 
71. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
72. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 278-82 (\964). 
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and convincing evidence to have published with knowledge of falsity 
or with reckless indifference to the truth or falsity of the communica-
tion.73 While that "actual malice" findi~g may be characterized as 
intent or recklessness, and thus apparently making it analogous to an 
intent or recklessness element of a different tort action, the specific 
nature of the "actual malice" state of mind needs to be recognized as 
constituting "intent to misstate a fact" or "recklessness as to the truth 
or falsity of a fact." 
The culpability element of the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress tort is substantially different from the "actual malice" require-
ment of the Sullivan line of cases. Intent in this context refers to the 
intent to produce the consequence of emotional distress, and ought to 
be satisfied with proof of either of the Restatement versions of intent-
a purpose to cause such a consequence or a knowledge that the conse-
quence was substantially certain to occur.74 Recklessness in this con-
text is a heightened version of negligence, requiring proof from which 
it can be inferred that the plaintiff acted in .spite of a high probability 
that emotional distress would be produced by the speech.7s Nothing 
in the emotional distress tort necessarily involves a culpable state of 
mind with regard to the truth or falsity of a statement of fact. Con-
versely, the state of mind that would constitute intent or recklessness 
in the emotional distress context would not necessarily be relevant to 
the issue of "actual malice" in the defamation setting. "Actual mal-
ice" focuses exclusively on fault as to falsity, while the intent and reck-
lessness elements of other tort claims are concerned with fault as to 
the harmful consequence. Reliance as sufficient protection on proof of 
that latter kind of fault, which would be an intent or recklessness with 
regard to injuring the reputation of a plaintiff, was rejected in the Sul-
livan line of decisions in favor of the focus on the state of mind with 
regard to the truth or falsity of the communication.76 
Once it is understood that there is a significant difference between 
"actual malice" and the culpability element of the emotional distress 
tort claim, two questions remain. First, does the "actual malice" re-
quirement make sense as a prerequisite to recovery for emotional dis-
73. [d. at 279-80. The Sullivan case dealt only with defamatory speech that was alleged to be 
about the official conduct of a public official. Later extensions of the "actual malice" rule to litigation 
arising from defamatory statements about other types of plaintiffs are described in LeBel, supra note 38, 
at 254-59. 
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
75. See id. at § 500. 
76. The distinction is often drawn in the cases as a difference between "actual malice" as defined 
in Sullivan and what now needs to be referred to as "common-law malice," in the sense of ill will 
toward, or intent to injure, the plaintiff. See. e.g .. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing, 419 U.S. 245, 251-
52 (1974) (distinguishing "actual malice" from "common-law malice"). 
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tress? Because the Supreme Court answered that question 
affirmatively,77 discussion of that issue will be taken up in the context 
of a comprehensive analysis of that Court's decision. 78 The second 
question is whether the court of appeals was correct in its conclusion 
that the culpability element of the emotional distress claim provides 
sufficient protection for the first amendment interests liability under 
this tort theory threatens. Arriving at the proper negative answer to 
that question requires a shift from the Fourth Circuit's narrow focus 
on what seems to be the same level of culpability shared by the two 
fault standards to an inquiry recognizing that different consequences 
might very well flow from requiring proof of different types of 
culpability. 
The previously established distinction between fault-as-to-falsity 
and fault-as-to-harmful-consequence is important not simply as a mat-
ter of academic interest. Its significance lies in the functional role that 
a CUlpability requirement plays in establishing the contours of a tort 
claim. The "actual malice" fault element injected by the Sullivan line 
of cases into public plaintiff defamation actions focuses on the defend-
ant's state of mind regarding the truth or falsity of the communication 
as a means of protecti!1g constitutionally valuable true speech that 
might be deterred by a strict liability rule. Imagining a spectrum (see 
Figure 1) in which true speech is divided from false speech, the Sulli-
van court was concerned about protecting and promoting all the con-
stitutionally valuable speech on the true side of the dividing line.79 In 
order to provide that protection, false speech is also constitutionally 
protected as long as the defendant did not have the requisite degree of 
culpability about the truth or falsity of what was said. From the 
standpoint of the publisher, therefore, what is protected is innocent-
or in the case of speech about a public official or a public figure, negli-
gent-misstatements of fact,80 even though those misstatements have 
no constitutional value.8l Ifthe goal is one of encouraging, or at least 
not discouraging, true speech, then it makes some sense to have a cul-
pability element that makes liability turn on the one thing that a po-
77. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988). 
78. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text. 
79. The best explanation of this idea is found in Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: 
Unraveling the "Chilling Effect, " 58 B. V.L. REV. 685 (\978). 
80. This is represented on Figure 1 as the speech to the left of the line dividing "no liability" from 
"liability" and to the right of the line dividing "true speech" from "false speech." 
81. The Supreme Court has stated explicitly that false statements of fact have no constitutional 
value. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 V.S. 323, 340 (1974). For a suggestion that this view is not 
necessarily correct, see LeBel, supra note 38, at 290 n.209. See also L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT 
SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 53-58 (1986). 
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tential defendant can control, which is that defendant's own state of 
mind regarding the truth or falsity of what is being communicated. 
FIGURE 1. 
Constitutional Protection of Defamatory Speech 
1 1 
no liability 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 innocent 1 
1 or 1 
1 negligent 1 
liability 
"actual malice" 
______ 1 ____ 1 ____ --,--__ 
1 
c(;mstitutionally 1 
valuable 1 
true speech 1 
1 
false speech having no 
constitutional value 
The kind of culpability involved in the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress-either an intent to cause emotional distress or 
recklessness about the production of that result-does not protect con-
stitutionally valuable speech as much as the fault-as-to-falsity rules of 
the Sullivan line of cases. Some of the most important speech in our 
society may in fact be uttered with just the kind of culpability that is 
required for the emotional distress tort action. The recognition of this 
fact is undoubtedly what led the Supreme Court to comment on its 
inability to distinguish vehement political rhetoric and caustic satire 
from Hustler's attack on Falwell. 82 
To look at the matter of potential liability once again from the 
standpoint of the publisher, the Fourth Circuit's rule protects speech 
that innocently or negligently produces emotional distress. The faulty 
parallel between the Fourth Circuit's culpability decision and the ef-
fect of the "actual malice" rule is easily demonstrable. As described 
above, the "actual malice" rule attempts to prevent the chilling of true 
speech by extending constitutional protection to some false speech. 
The Fourth Circuit's rule operates to protect some speech that (inno-
cently or negligently) causes emotional distress. If the Fourth Circuit 
is correct in its assertion that the relevant concern is the level of culpa-
bility, so that the intent or recklessness fault element of the emotional 
distress action is a legitimate substitute for the "actual malice" re-
82. 108 s. Ct. at 881. 
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quirement, the equivalent spectrum in this context (see Figure 2) 
would depict the difference between speech that does not cause emo-
tional distress and speech that does. To depict the liability possibilities 
along that spectrum would make it appear that the constitutional 
value the Fourth Circuit's rule protects would be the publication of 
speech that does not cause emotional distress. In order to prevent the 
chilling of some of this kind of speech, the Constitution would be seen 
as protecting speech that does cause emotional distress, as long as it 
does so only innocently or negligently. This faulty parallel to the Sul-
livan rationale for the "actual malice" rule suggests the need to look 
for an alternative explanation of the relationship between first amend-
ment interests and the threat posed by unrestrained liability under the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress tort claim. 83 
FIGURE 2. 
The Flawed Protection Scheme of the Fourth 
Circuit's Decision 
1 
1 
1 
no liability 1 
1 1 
1 innocence 1 
1 or 1 
1 negligence 1 
liability 
intent or 
recklessness 
_______ 1 ____ 1 ___ _ 
1 
speech that does 1 
not cause 1 
emotional distress 1 
speech that does 
cause emotional distress 
This exercise in tracing the reasoning behind the "actual malice" 
requirement and in finding such reasoning inapplicable to the emo-
tional distress context reveals that the Fourth Circuit'S focus only on 
the levels of culpability involved in an intentional tort and in the "ac-
tual malice" standard is incomplete. A constitutional fault rule for the 
emotional distress tort action that does not focus on the kind of fault 
as well as the level of fault does not serve the same protective function 
as the "actual malice" rule of the law of defamation. Although the 
Fourth Circuit's method of drawing a parallel to the Sullivan fault 
standard is unsuccessful, the attempt to construct a parallel provides 
an instructive lesson for the development of a properly constitutional-
83. An alternative model is depicted in figure 3, infra p. 352. 
HeinOnline -- 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 334 1989
334 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
ized emotional distress tort, that is pursued below.84 The analysis of 
the Fourth Circuit's opinion, however, demonstrates that a fault ele-
ment focusing only on the state of mind of the defendant with regard 
to causing harm to the plaintiff provides an insufficient shield for 
speech that should receive constitutional protection. 
What emerges is a conclusion that the Court of Appeals asked the 
wrong question. Instead of asking whether the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress tort action required the same level of fault as the 
constitutionalized public plaintiff defamation action, the court should 
have asked whether the intentional or reckless misconduct culpability 
element of the emotional distress action was as effective at protecting 
constitutionally valuable speech as the "actual malice" requirement. 
Because the answer to that question is no, the Supreme Court was 
correct in rejecting the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the fault element 
of the emotional distress action. 
However correct the Supreme Court was in rejecting the rationale 
for the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Court's performance was marred 
by its failure to appreciate the problems created by adopting a fairly 
uncritical attitude toward incorporating into the emotional distress 
context the specific details of the constitutional protection developed 
for defamatory speech. The Supreme Court held that Falwell could 
recover only if he proved that a false statement of fact had been pub-
lished with "actual malice."85 That holding distorts the treatment of 
the issues presented to the Court in two different ways. First, the kind 
of fault embodied in the "actual malice" standard has no particular 
relevance to an emotional distress action. As already explained, fault 
as to falsity has no necessary relationship to intent or recklessness with 
regard to the infliction of emotional distress.86 Furthermore, the con-
ceptual thrust of the emotional distress claim does not depend on any 
showing of the communication of false statements of fact. As a result 
of the grafting of a new "false factual statement" requirement onto the 
emotional distress action,87 the Court has created a hybrid tort action 
that inadequately protects individuals from harmful conduct designed 
to injure them. 
Second, the Court's implication that a false statement of fact is 
the only kind of speech that is actionable is unwarranted. The Court 
has transformed a description of the kind of speech that is condition-
ally constitutionally privileged (that is, defamatory statements) into an 
84. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text. 
85. Falwell, 108 s. Ct. at 882. 
86. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
87. The Fourth Circuit was correct in recognizing that the application of the "actual malice" 
requirement would accomplish this. See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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exhaustive description of the kind of speech that might have liability 
attached to it. Such a transformation must rest at least implicitly on a 
conclusion that any harm caused by speech other than a false state-
ment of fact must necessarily be less significant than the social value 
that is attached to that speech. While that conclusion may legiti-
mately be reached on a case-by-case evaluation, this is not an appro-
priate instance or the proper level of abstraction for the Court to use 
the categorical determinations employed elsewhere in the constitution-
alization of speech torts.88 Given the faulty premises from which the 
Court's holding emerged, its opinion is a matter of limited preceden-
tial value, largely confined to the facts of the Falwell case, until the 
Court returns to the issue of how to set first amendment restrictions 
on recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The Supreme Court's decision to incorporate the "actual malice" 
standard developed in the defamation context into the emotional dis-
tress tort action represents nearly as poor an appreciation bf how that 
standard functions as was displayed by the Fourth Circuit. On that 
point, the opinion of Justice White concurring in the judgment in. 
Falwell is surely correct. 89 What is missing from that concurring 
opinion, however, is any explanation of why "the decision in New 
York Times v. Sullivan . .. has little to do with this case."90 The 
reason why the Sullivan decision has little to do with the Falwell case 
is simple: the emotional distress claim asserted by Falwell is suffi-
ciently different from a defamation claim that the rules adopted for 
defamation claims do not fit in the emotional distress context. What 
the Court failed to grasp was the nature and the significance of that 
difference. The Court's basic error was treating alike categories of 
claims that are not alike. 
Correcting the Court's error requires a careful consideration of 
the distinction drawn earlier91 between redundant and nonevasive al-
ternatives to a defamation claim. Before explaining how to apply the 
distinction between redundant and nonevasive alternatives, however, it 
88. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,343-44 (1974) (refusing to strike the balance 
between "needs of the press and the individual's claim to compensation" on a case-by-case basis, and 
instead laying down "broad rules of general application"). In this case, the implicit Falwell rule-to the 
effect that there can be no liability for anything that is not a false statement of fact-is adopted without 
even the broad type of balancing that the Court performed in Gertz. The alternative approach de-
scribed below proceeds from the premise that individual harm may outweigh the value even of speech 
that does not communicate a false statement of fact. The important inquiry is whether particular 
speech has value. That determination ought not to be made on the basis of a general dichotomy be-
tween false statements of fact and all other speech. 
89. 108 S. Ct. 876, 883. 
90. Id. 
91. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
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would be helpful to provide a preliminary statement of the general 
rules that should be followed. 
Alternative tort claims that are properly characterized as redun-
dant ought to be treated in the same way. In this setting, that rule 
means that the pleading of alternative claims should be collapsed into 
one claim, so that the highest level of constitutional protection recog-
nized for any of the alternatives ought to govern the outcome of all the 
alternatives.92 Nonevasive alternatives, on the other hand, ought not 
to be treated as identical. Accordingly, when faced with a nonevasive 
alternative to a defamation claim the Court should determine what 
sort of constitutional restriction to impose on that alternative tort 
claim, rather than simply transfer the defamation restrictions to a con-
text in which they do not fit. 
For those general rules to have any utility, it is necessary to be 
able to identify which type of alternative is present in a particular tort 
action. The purpose of the distinction is to separate those nondefama-
tion tort claims that are mere evasions of constitutional restrictions 
from those that are something more. It should be understood that the 
last phrase is deliberately "something more," rather than "something 
else." A nonevasive tort claim is, of course, on one level a way around 
the barriers that stand between the plaintiff and recovery. If the only 
factor in classifying the alternatives was the intent of the plaintiff to 
recover under a theory that avoids barriers associated with another 
theory, then all nondefamation claims arising out of a set of facts in 
which a defamation claim has some minimum plausibility would be 
classified as redundant. As used in this context, however, the distinc-
tion between redundant and nonevasive claims refers not to the intent 
to find another way to recover, but rather to the presence of a factual 
predicate for a claim that does not simply correspond to the defama-
tion predicate. 
As mentioned earlier,93 fault-based tort claims share two general 
features that are relevant to the distinction suggested here. First, they 
consist of a particular kind of wrongful conduct, and second, they pro-
duce a particular kind of invasion of a legally protected interest. The 
difference between redundant and nonevasive tort claims might be ex-
pressed in terms of those two features in this way: If the conduct and 
the harm asserted in multiple tort claims are identical, then multiple 
tort claims can be classified as redundant despite the ability to charac-
92. There is an implicit assumption in the statement in the text that the higher levels of constitu-
tional protection are associated with the defamation claims. To the extent that the assumption proves 
to be ungrounded. see infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. the general rule stated in the text 
might alternatively be read in a way that substitutes "most carefully thought out" for "highest." 
93. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
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terize one or more elements of the tort claims in different ways. A 
couple of examples will illustrate the distinction, which can then be 
applied to the facts of the Falwell case. 
Suppose that my name is put forward as a nominee for appoint-
ment as a federal judge, and that a faculty colleague writes a letter to 
the editor of the local newspaper asserting that I have been using co-
caine in the faculty lounge. That letter contains a false (trust me!) and 
defamatory statement, published to a third person, capable of doing 
great damage to my reputation. The wrongful conduct of my col-
league consists of publishing a false statement capable of causing in-
jury to my reputation, which is the gravamen of the tort of 
defamation. 94 The harm caused by that conduct can consist of a 
number of different effects, all of which the law of defamation recog-
nizes as legally cognizable harms. Those effects include such matters 
as reputational injury, special damages (in the sense of actual loss at-
tributable to the reputational injury-the withdrawal of the nomina-
tion, for example), and actual injury other than reputational injury 
(such as emotional distress).95 
The facts underlying my defamation claim in this hypothetical 
also may be characterized as extreme and outrageous conduct by my 
colleague that might cause me to suffer severe emotional distress. An 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim would nevertheless be 
classified as redundant in this instance for two reasons. Fjrst, exactly 
the same conduct on the part of the defendant that serves as the basis 
of the defamation claim also serves as the basis of the emotional dis-
tress claim. On this occasion, the extreme and outrageous conduct by 
the defendant consists of the publication of the false statement capable 
of causing injury to my reputation. Second, the law that governs the 
disposition of the defamation claim allows me to recover for the inter-
ference with my interest in freedom from emotional distress, even if no 
actual injury to reputation is established. Even if I cannot prove that 
my reputation was injured, damages for emotional distress are a com-
pensable type of actual injury for which the Supreme Court has found 
recovery to be constitutionally permissible.96 The difference between 
the defamation claim and the emotional distress claim lies first in the 
characterization of the defendant's conduct in a particular way, that 
is, as extreme and outrilgeous rather than as publication of a defama-
tory statement. The second difference between the emotional distress 
claim and a defa~ation claim lies in the identification of an indepen-
94. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
95. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). 
96. See supra note 54. 
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dently protectable legal interest in freedom from emotional distress 
rather than just the interest in the preservation of reputation. Under 
the first of the general rules proposed above, because the alternative. 
claims can be characterized as redundant, the emotional distress claim 
should be collapsed into the defamation claim, and the liability of the 
defendant determined under the constitutional restrictions associated 
with defamation. 
Another example of how to identify a redundant alternative tort 
claim involves a situation in which the plaintiff asserts a false light 
invasion of privacy claim. Commentators and courts have attempted 
to explain the distinction between a false light claim and a defamation 
claim arising from the same conduct. The more plausible attempts to 
distinguish the claims point to· the difference between an interest in 
privacy and an interest in reputation.97 As long as the two character-
istic factors identified above are present, however, it would be appro-
priate to characterize the false light claim as a redundant alternative. 
That characterization follows from the identification of identical con-
duct on the part of the defendant (publication of a false statement that 
tends to injure the reputation of the plaintiff) which typically underlies 
both claims, and from the determination that the different interest in-
vasion protected by the false light claim (the harms associated with 
having one's privacy invaded by being presented to the public as some-
thing other ,than what one is) is compensable within the defamation 
claim. In circumstances in which a false light claim can be character-
ized as a redundant alternative to a defamation claim, there is no rea-
son to permit the false light privacy claim to operate as a means of 
avoiding the constitutional protections that have been developed for 
defamatory speech. 
Further evidence of the analytical utility of the distinction be-
tween redundant and nonevasive alternatives is provided by the 
Supreme Court's treatment of the constitutional restrictions imposed 
on false light claims. At the time of its first consideration of the false 
light claim,98 the Court had adopted the "actual malice" rule for pub-
lic official defamation plaintiffs,99 but had yet to consider the various 
other issues that flowed from that initial decision. loo At that time, the 
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment b (1977). See also Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, 433 U.S. 562, 572-74 (1977) (describing differe~ces between defamation 
and false light privacy torts). 
98. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
99. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376·U.S. 254 (1964). 
100. The decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1964), preceded by five months the decision 
extending the "actual malice" rule to public figure defamation plaintiffs. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
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Court extended to the false light privacy defendant the same constitu-
tional protection that it had given to defamation defendants, namely, 
the restriction of liability to a claim based on a communication that 
was published with "actual malice." 101 Subsequently, distinctions 
among types of plaintiffs 102 and kinds of speech 103 were introduced 
into the defamation context as bases for the adoption of different sorts 
of constitutional rules, but similar distinctions have yet to be adopted 
by the Supreme Court in the false light context. 104 
The two examples discussed so far have presented alternative tort 
claims that should be characterized as redundant. Under the rule pro-
posed here, those claims should be subjected to the constitutional re-
strictions associated with the defamation claim.105 What remains for 
consideration is the hypothesis that the emotional distress claim in the 
Falwell case is not a redundant alternative to a defamation claim. As a 
nonevasive alternative, the emotional distress claim would therefore 
require the development of its own constitutional regime distinct from 
the defamation claim. 
A redundancy characterization requires the alternative tort claim 
to be based on the same wrongful conduct and to cause a kind of harm 
that is compensable within the framework of a defamation claim. For 
a defamation claim to be available, the defendant must have published 
a false statement of fact capable of injuring the reputation of the plain-
tiff.106 According to the finding of the jury in the Falwell case, that is 
not what the defendants did in this case. The jury's finding, which was 
accepted by both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, was 
that the published statements could not reasonably be understood to 
be statements of actual facts or events. 107 If that is true, then the state-
101. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 390. 
102. See supra notes 73, 100. 
103. See supra note 57. 
104. The latest false light decision of the Court was Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 
U.S. 245 (1974). Because the liability of the defendant in that case was based on the plaintifrs presenta-
tion of evidence that was sufficient to satisfy the "actual malice" standard of culpability, Cantrell did 
not present the Supreme Court with an occasion for consideration of whether the first amendment 
prohibited a standard permitting recovery on a lesser showing of culpability to govern some false light 
claims. 
105. The normative suggestion that follows from the drawing of the distinction between redun-
dant and nonevasive alternatives calls for a reform of the current disparity between the constitutional 
restrictions attached to defamation claims and those attached to false light claims. Different constitu-
tional rules for those redundant alternative claims need to be eliminated or independently justified. The 
false light experience provides an interesting example of how the Supreme Court could employ the 
analytical method offered here to reach a result-equivalent constitutional rules for two tort claims-
that is proper in the false light context but improper in the emotional distress context presented in 
Falwell. 
106. See supra note 53. 
107. See supra note 3. 
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ments should not be characterized as capable of injuring the reputa-
tion of the plaintiff. Common sense suggests that a plaintiffs 
reputation would not be affected by statements that the jury found no 
reasonable person could take to be true statements about that plaintiff. 
Given the finding of the jury, therefore, the wrongful conduct of the 
defendants must have consisted of something other than the publica-
tion of false statements of fact capable of injuring the reputation of the 
plaintiff. Because a defamation claim was not available in this situa-
tion, it would be inappropriate to consider the emotional distress tort 
claim to be a redundant alternative to a defamation claim. If the claim 
is nonevasive rather than redundant, then under the rule proposed 
above the Court should consider what type of constitutional restric-
tions ought to be placed on this claim. 
Earlier in this section of this article,108 two questions were identi-
fied as being presented by the Falwell case. First, should the "actual 
malice" rule apply to emotional distress actions? The court of appeals 
correctly said no, while the Supreme Court erroneously said yes. Sec-
ond, does the fault element of the emotional distress tort provide ade-
quate protection for valuable speech? The court of appeals incorrectly 
said yes, while the Supreme Court's affirmative response to the first 
question implied that it would reach the proper negative answer. The 
remaining task of this article is to demonstrate how each of those two 
questions could have been answered correctly by adopting a compre-
hensive explanation of why and how the first amendment affects recov-
ery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
III. A PROPERLY CONSTITUTION ALI ZED EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
TORT 
Before considering the manner in which the emotional distress 
tort ought to be constitutionalized, it is useful to pursue the questiorf 
of whether there was any need to resort to constitutional decisionmak-
ing in the Falwell case. The first amendment comes into play in this 
sort of situation only if free speech interests are threatened by liability 
imposed on a defendant as a matter of state tort law. One might easily 
argue that because the plaintiffs tort claim should have been held to 
be insufficient as a matter of tort law, the Falwell case need never have 
been presented to the United States Supreme Court. For that reason, 
Falwell is distinguishable from such landmark first amendment cases 
as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.109 In Sullivan, the threat to first 
amendment interests was posed by the application of a body of state 
108. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
109. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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tort law as it was understood and fairly routinely applied by the state 
courts. Because no error of state law was committed in the Sullivan 
case, 110 the options for protecting the first amendment interests were 
limited to changing state law (a matter for the state legislature or judi-
ciary) or to finding some federal constitutional restriction to impose on 
recovery under the state law. Given the reasons to suspect that the 
threat to first amendment interests was in line with and not just coinci-
dental to the state policy of that time, 111 the Supreme Court correctly 
stepped in to impose constitutional limitations on the tort law under 
which the plaintiff recovered. 
The Falwell case presents a significantly different scenario. First, 
no state court had ever decided the tort law issues involved in 
Falwell's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The case 
was filed in a federal district court, with the appeal from the judgment 
in favor of Falwell proceeding naturally to the federal court of appeals. 
Thus there was no definitive statement comparable to the Alabama 
Supreme Court decision in Sullivan approving the application of state 
law to impose liability on the defendant. Second, the emotional dis-
tress tort claim Falwell asserted had only fairly recently been recog-
nized by the state supreme court. 112 As a result, there was relatively 
little authority from which the federal court could predict what the 
Virginia state courts would ao with that sort of claim. Third, there is 
absolutely no basis from which to infer that hostility to first amend-
ment interests was part of the public policy or the political climate 
prevailing within Virginia at the time of the Falwel/litigation as it was 
in Alabama at the time of Sullivan. Finally, and most significantly, 
the decision by the federal district court to allow the plaintiff to re-
cover on an emotional distress claim imposed as undemanding an ap-
plication of the state tort law's elements of proof as one is likely to 
find. 
The intentional infliction of emotional distress action recognized 
by the Supreme Court of Virginia requires the plaintiff to prove the 
defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional dis-
110. The trial court's judgment based on the verdict for the plaintiff in Sullivan was affirmed by 
the state supreme court. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (\962). 
II \. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) 
(describing other libel actions pending in Alabama state courts, and commenting, from the informed 
perspective of a native of Alabama, on the likelihood that the plaintiff's position in his community had 
been improved rather than harmed by the publication of statements that attributed racially discrimina· 
tory acts to him). See also Pierce, The Anatomy 0/ an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 43 N.C. L.REV. 315 (1965). 
112. See Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974). This case was decided by the 
Supreme Court of Virginia in December 1974. Falwell's claim was filed in October 1983. 
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tress. 113 This standard should be applied in a more demanding fashion 
than it was in Falwell. In the leading case in which the state supreme 
court recognized the tort claim, Womack v. Eldridge,114 an investiga-
tor working for a lawyer who was defending a client accused of child 
molesting tricked her way into the plaintiff's home and took a photo-
graph of the plaintiff. That photograph was then shown to the victims 
of the molestation, who were asked whether the plaintiff was the man 
who had molested them. The victims testified that the plaintiff was 
not the person, but the authorities nevertheless pursued the issue of 
whether the plaintiff was involved in the offense. 115 At the trial of his 
emotional distress claim, the plaintiff testified that he had "suffered 
great shock, distress, and nervousness," that he "suffered great anxiety 
as to what people would think of him," that he feared that he would be 
accused of child molesting as a result of the defendant's conduct, and 
that he "had been unable to sleep while the matter was being investi-
gated."116 The state supreme court's opinion in that case also notes 
that the plaintiff became "emotional and incoherent" while he was tes-
tifying.117 In addition, the plaintiff's wife testified that the plaintiff 
"experienced great shock and mental depression" as a result of the 
incident. 118 
The record in the Falwell case on the issue of the severity of the 
plaintiff's emotional distress is significantly less compelling than in 
Womack. The Fourth Circuit excerpt from the plaintiff's testimony at 
trial speaks of "anger" that turned into "a more rational and deep 
hurt." 119 A colleague of the plaintiff testified that the plaintiff's "abil-
ity to concentrate on the myriad details of running his extensive minis-
try was diminished."120 Absent is any evidence that even comes close 
to being equivalent to evidence of emotional distress that the state 
courts had previously characterized as severe. Hence, the district 
court in Falwell could have granted a directed verdict in favor of the 
defendants or entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 
emotional distress claim. Failing that, the appellate courts could have 
113. According to the RESTATEMENT, "[t]he law intervenes only where the [emotional] distress 
inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the 
duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 46 comment i (1965). 
114. 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974). 
115. [d. at 339-40, 210 S.E.2d at 146-47. 
116. [d. at 340, 210 S.E.2d at 147. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. 
119. See 797 F.2d at 1276. 
120. [d. at 1277. Rodney Smolla's recent book on the case doesn't disclose any more compelling 
evidence of the emotional distress suffered by Falwell. See generally R. SMOLLA, supra note 18. 
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set aside the judgment for the plaintiff on the basis of the insufficiency 
of the evidence to satisfy this element of the tort action. 121 Further-
more, if the federal courts were unsure how the Virginia state courts 
would have characterized the evidence in this case, they had the op-
tion of using the state's recently adopted certification procedure. 122 
Employing the certification option might have enabled the federal 
courts to avoid the constitutional issue altogether by giving the 
Supreme Court of Virginia the opportunity to rule that Falwell's emo-
tional distress claim asserted by Falwell failed as a matter of state tort 
law. 
Falwell is thus distinguishable from a case such as Sullivan, in 
that first amendment interests could have been adequately protected 
by an application of state tort law that was arguably both fairly easily 
obtainable and more demanding than the application that occurred in 
the trial and appellate stages of the litigation. Nevertheless, because it 
IS conceivable that an emotional distress action might be employed in 
the manner in which the Alabama libel action was used in the Sullivan 
litigation (i.e., to cast a deliberate chill on important speech), this arti- . 
cle concludes by fixing the contours of a properly constitutionalized 
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
A useful preliminary step may be the identification of the basis for 
allowing recovery on the underlying tort theory. As described ear-
lier,123 the independent action for the infliction of emotional distress is 
a relatively recent product of tort law. A consideration of why the 
emotional distress tort action is justified at all might make the develop-
ment of the first amendment restrictions on that action easier to 
accomplish. 
One of the best scholarly treatments of the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress action is found in an article by Professor Daniel 
Givelber,124 in which he asserts the "major mission and justification" 
121. Independent appellate review of some constitutional issues in defamation cases has been ex-
plicitly approved by the Supreme Court. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 
U.S. 485 (1984). Under the Bose standard, the appellate court might have taken a very demanding look 
at the evidence that supported a liability judgment with first amendmerit implications. 
122. VA. CONST. art. VI, § I; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:42. This procedure allows federal courts to 
certify to the state supreme court questions of state law that might dispose of the federal case without 
requiring a consideration of federal constitutional issues that might otherwise be presented. The prac-
tice and the philosophical underpinnings of certification are described in LeBel, Legal Positivism and 
Federalism: The Certification Experience, 19 GA. L. REV. 999 (1985). 
The procedure was recently employed in a fede:al proceeding challenging the constitutionality of a 
portion of the state's obscenity legislation. See Commonwealth v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 372 
S.E.2d 618 (1988). 
123. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
124. Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982). 
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for the tort is "to provide the basis for achieving situational justice" 125 
when a party in a disadvantageous position in a preexisting relation-
ship fails to adhere to "a basic level off air procedure and decency."126 
Discerning in the cases a use of the tort as the basis for providing 
something on the order of a " 'private due process' in dealings between 
unequals,"127 Professor Givelber finds the "results more unpredict-
able, and doctrine virtually nonexistent" when the parties do not have 
a contractual relationship. 128 . 
At the heart of the Givelber conception of the emotional distress 
tort is the sense that the tortious conduct consists of the abusive exer-
cise of power that the defendant holds over the plaintiff. Even in the 
noncontractual sphere, however, that conception of the tort could 
have considerable explanatory power. In order to arrive at the moral 
foundation of this tort claim, one simply needs to ask what it is that is 
abusive about that exercise of power. An answer that places this tort 
claim in a broader category of moral reasoning is that the wrong con-
sists of treating the plaintiff as a means to an end of the defendant, 
rather than as an individual who is for that reason alone entitled to 
respect and dignity. In the emotional distress context, the abuse con-
sists of the defendant's use of the plaintiff's emotional well-being as a 
means to further some private end of the defendant. 
A plaintiff-as-means understanding of the basis for condemnation 
of the defendant's conduct is likely to prove much too sweeping as a 
basis for liability. Suggesting that a defendant faces tort liability any 
time that the defendant acts in a way that treats the plaintiff as a 
means to the defendant's end would bring tort law into play in what 
would undoubtedly prove to be too numerous instances of a variety of 
common situations. Such an understanding can, however, serve as the 
cornerstone from which to evaluate and construct a constitutionaliza-
tion scheme for the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Considering the tort claim in the light of why the 
defendant's conduct is wrong might provide a core of coherence 
around which a workable body of law can be built. 129 
To constitutionalize the emotional distress tort action in the same 
manner as the defamation and privacy torts have been constitutional-
125. Id. at 75. 
126. Id. at 63. 
127. Id. at 43. 
128. Id. at 63. 
129. Lee Bollinger's work on first amendment theory notes the tendency of free speech propo-
nents to undervalue the harm that speech can cause. See, e.g., L BOLLINGER, supra note 82, at 57 
passim. One of the purposes of the suggestion in the text is to take seriously the claims of individuals to 
be free from emotional distress caused by the speech of other people. 
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ized in the last quarter-century, one would examine the existing ele-
ments of the tort,130 looking for hooks on which to hang first 
amendment protection. That search would attempt to identify those 
elements of the tort claim that correct abuses in the application of the 
tort action and defend the constitutional values that underlie the first 
amendment. The falsity elements of defamation and false light privacy 
claims have served that function in the context of promoting the publi-
cation of true statements of fact, but as explained earlier, the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim has no such falsity element. 
However, there are two elements of the emotional distress claim that 
can serve as the basis for the incorporation of constitutional restric-
tions on liability-the elements of damages and conduct. 
As suggested earlier,131 the damages element of the emotional dis-
tress tort is the most promising basis on which to dispose of the claim 
in the Falwell case. If the evidence in a particular case is determined 
to be sufficient to satisfy the state tort law requirement that a plaintiff 
suffer severe emotional distress, as it was held to do by the trial and 
intermediate appellate courts in Falwell, \32 then making this element a 
matter of constitutional significance offers a way to place first amend-
ment restrictions on the tort recovery. Furthermore, this technique 
would not be a radical departure from the way in which the first 
amendment has been held to limit recovery in other tort contexts. 
Constitutionalizing the damages element of a speech tort is' a tactic 
adopted by the Court in the Gertz case.133 There the Court held that 
presumed damages and punitive damages for defamatory publications 
could only be recovered on a showing of "actual malice."134 
Treating the damages element of the emotional distress tort as a 
matter of constitutional significance has a number of advantages. 
First, the Court could establish a constitutional threshold level of 
harm that plaintiff must cross before the tort claim can succeed. In 
this way, trivial interferences with emotional tranquility can be 
screened out before claims are allowed to get to juries. Second, the 
130. Those elements are: 
I) intent or recklessness; 
2) extreme and outrageous conduct; 
3) proximate causation; and 
4) severe emotional distress. 
See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
131. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text. 
132. See 797 F.2d at 1276-77. 
133. Gertz v. Robert WeIch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
134. The Court subsequently held that the Gertz restriction on recovery of presumed and punitive 
damages applies only in cases in which the defamatory communication involves a matter of public 
concern. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
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damages element might be sUbjected to the same heightened scrutiny 
of appellate review as the "actual malice" requirement in defamation 
cases.135 Such a standard of review would encourage trial courts to be 
sure that a plaintiff has adequate evidence' of the element in question, 
and would allow appellate courts to step in as a further safeguard 
should the trial courts let the application of the constitutionalized 
damages element slip below the requisite level of proof. Third, the 
constitutionalized damages element might be subjected to a heightened 
standard of proof, again following the model of the "actual malice" 
requirement of the defamation tort action. 136 Insistence on proof of 
the severity of the plaintiff's emotional distress by clear and convincing 
evidence would not only act as a: further screening device for less than 
compelling cases but would also give the trial court an opportunity to 
dispose of the claim relatively early in the litigation process. 137 
The multiple facets of this first step of constitutionalizing the 
emotional distress tort action could serve as a basis for a preliminary 
judicial evaluation of recovery for severe emotional distress in the 
speech-about cases which pose the greatest threat to first amendment 
values. Recovery in such cases should be limited to instances in which 
the plaintiff has introduced clear and convincing evidence that the dis-
tress caused138 by the defendant's conduct was, in some meaningful 
sense, disabling. Absent such evidence, the emotional distress claim 
should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
Expert testimony from a health care professional could be intro-· 
duced to establish that the emotional distress has reached the required 
level, but medical testimony should not be made a necessary element 
of proof. A plaintiff should simply be required to demonstrate in some 
credible fashion that the defendant's conduct so disrupted and inter-
fered with the plaintiff's ability to function in normal ways that the 
emotional distress was, as a practical matter, virtually indistinguish-
able from a physical injury which forces a change in the plaintiff's 
activity. Indeed, a sociologist who has worked closely with lawyers in 
135. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 
136. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) ("actual malice" must be 
shown by proof of convincing clarity). 
137. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (courts are to apply the clear and 
convincing evidence standard of proof when evaluating sufficiency of evidence to survive a motion for 
summary judgment). 
138. The Virginia law of negligent infliction of emotional distress in cases in which there is no 
physical impact with the body of the plaintiff requires that the causal connection between the defend-
ant's conduct and the emotional distress must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See 
Hughes v. Moore, 211 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973). A court concerned about the ease with which 
emotional distress might be proved to be "severe" might use the causation element as another hook on 
which to hang both the heightened standard of proof and the independent appellate review protective 
devices employed in the defamation context. 
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trying to understand the nature of the traumatic response to a disaster 
refers to the possibility of "a kind of psychological concussion.,,139 
This disabling distress standard could be applied in a manner that is 
substantially more demanding than whatever standard the lower 
courts thought they were applying in the Falwell case. Under this 
standard, the testimony of anger and temporary distraction offered by 
Falwell and his associate would fall short of establishing the disabling 
level of distress required for recovery. 
As part of the constitutionalization of the damages element of the 
emotional distress tort, it ought to be made clear that the "bootstrap" 
technique approved in the Restatement (Second) of Torts should not be 
employed. According to the Restatement comments to § 46, the fact 
that the distress is severe "must be proved; but in many cases the ex-
treme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself 
important evidence that the distress has existed."I40 The inference of 
one tort element from the existence of another is not unique to the 
emotional distress action.141 However, in a case in which significant 
constitutional interests might be placed in jeopardy, courts ought to 
make it clear that the plaintiff must present convincing evidence of 
each of the tort elements-particularly those that are being treated as 
matters of constitutional significance. 
The damages element of the emotional distress action is the 
proper place to begin an inquiry into the manner in which a protection 
of constitutional interests can be introduced into the tort claim. Once 
the plaintiff has established that he or she has suffered disabling harm 
and that the defendant intended to cause such harm, then the plaintiff 
should be entitled to compensation unless the harm was justified or 
privileged. This claim of entitlement to compensation, while not car-
rying with it an imposition of a formal burden of proof on the defend-
ant,142 reflects the moral claim that the plaintiff should not have to be 
the uncompensated victim of an intentional infliction of harm without 
a good reason for imposing the burden of that injury on the plaintiff. 
139. K. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO 
CREEK FLOOD 258 (1976). . 
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965). 
141. An example of this bootstrapping of elements is found in the malicious prosecution action. 
Among the elements of the tort claim are the initiation of criminal proceedings without probable cause 
and primarily for a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice (malice). See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977). The RESTATEMENT allows the lack of probable cause to serve as 
evidence of an improper purpose, id. § 669, but an improper purpose is not evidence of the lack of 
probable cause, id. § 669A. 
142. See, e.g .• Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) ("a private· figure 
plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at issue is false before recovering damages [for 
defamation) from a media defendant"). 
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A claim by a person who has actually suffered severe emotional dis-
tress, at the hands of a defendant who intended that result, deserves to 
be taken seriously by the courts. 
The second of the emotional distress tort's elements that ought to 
be made a matter of constitutional significance is requiring the plain-
tiff to prove that the defendant's conduct can be characterized as "ex-
treme and outrageous." Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that this 
element could not serve as the basis for distinguishing constitutionally 
acceptable liability from impermissible infringements on first amend-
ment values. 143 As the element was applied in the Falwell case, the 
Chief Justice may have been correct. Simply stating that conduct 
must be extreme and outrageous before attacJ. ing liability to the con-
duct would not be an adequate measure to extend first amendment 
protection to constitutionally valuable speech. To the extent that the 
lower court opinions in the Falwell case support that view, they were 
properly rejected by the Supreme Court. However, in examining the 
relationship between the first amendment and this tort action, the task 
for the Court here is the same as it was in connection with the other 
speech torts that have been constitutionalized. What the Court needs 
to do is consider whether the element can be applied in a manner that 
serves its protective purpose while still retaining an ability to accom-
plish the tort law aims associated with the action. 
One way in which this element could be modified in order to still 
distinguish permissible from impermissible liability situations would 
be to pour some content into the nebulous terms "extreme" and "out-
rageous." In this instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts l44 pro-
vides almost no help to a court trying to establish guidelines for 
litigation of emotional distress claims that impinge on constitutional 
interests. The Restatement's treatment of this element depends more 
on the factfinder's having an intuitive reaction of a particular kind 
than on the factfinder reaching an intellectual conclusion. According 
to the Restatement, this element is satisfied when "the conduct has 
been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atro-
cious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."145 Proof that 
the defendant's conduct sinks to this level is described in the Restate-
ment in a way that lends itself to a characterization as a trial by ex-
clamatory outburst, stating that "[g]enerally, the case is one in which 
the recitation of, the facts to an average member of the community 
143. 108 s. Ct. at 881·82. 
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965). 
145. Id. 
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would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to ex-
claim, 'Outrageous!' "146 
Given the Restatement's inadequate approach to the extreme and 
outrageous conduct element, that element requires careful supplemen-
tation if the emotional distress tort claim is to be applied in a way that 
does not too greatly infringe on first amendment interests. "Resent-
ment of the actor" and "exclaiming, 'Outrageous!' " are reactions that 
"an average member of the community" might have to a good deal of 
constitutionally valuable and legitimately protected speech. Allowing 
liability to turn on such a reaction, without any further check on lia-
bility, would create just the sort of difficulties that the Chief Justice 
recognized in his Falwell opinion. The task for the Court, therefore, is 
to fashion this element of the tort into a standard that adequately pro-
tects first amendment interests and yet leaves some room for the impo-
sition of liability in situations in which constitutional protection is 
undeserved and unwarranted. It is the attainment of that latter goal 
that is missing entirely in the Court's decision in Falwell. The remain-
der of this article will show' that the goal can be reached. 
Fortunately for one attempting to determine the nature of consti-
tutionally acceptable definition of extreme and outrageous conduct, 
there are two sources of guidance to construct a useful standard. One 
is a matter of constitutional purpose and the other a matter of consti-
tutional precedent. First, determining what the element is supposed to 
accomplish is essential. The first amendment is designed to promote 
the fullest possible expression of "speech that matters."147 In order to 
accomplish that end, protection sometimes must be extended to speech 
that does not matter, at least in constitutional terms. 148 
When deciding whether constitutional protection ought to be ex-
tended to a particular situation, then, a court needs to ask two ques-
tions. An affirmative answer to either of those questions leads to a 
recognition of limitations on liability. The first question is whether the 
communication is speech that matters. If so, then the constitution re-
quires some protection of that speech. First amendment precedent 
provides a way to answer the question, as will be demonstrated 
shortly. But even if that question is answered in the negative, an af-
firmative answer to a second question, about speech that does not mat-
ter, also leads to the recognition of constitutional protection. The 
second question that needs to be asked about this category of speech is 
146. [d. 
147. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). 
148. See id. ("The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect 
speech that matters") (emphasis added). 
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whether the distinction between the speech at issue and speech that 
matters is so difficult to draw that the risk of error in drawing the 
distinction ought not to be placed on the speaker. It was a negative 
answer to this second question on the issue of the truth of defamatory 
statements that led the Court to adopt the "actual malice" require-
ment in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 149 
If the difficulty of drawing the line dividing constitutionally valu-
able speech from speech that lacks such value is not very pronounced, 
then the case for constitutional protection of the valueless speech is 
considerably less compelling. It is when th!lt distinction is thought to 
rest exclusively on the difference between truth and falsity that the 
chilling effect concerns of the Sullivan line of cases are at their highest. 
If another sort of distinction can be identified, one that is more care-
fully tailored to the emotional distress tort than is the truth/falsity 
distinction, then the extension of constitutional protection to valueless 
speech ought to be less necessary. 
The abstract considerations derived from the purpose of constitu-
tionalizing the extreme and outrageous conduct element of the tort 
provide some assistance in determining how to set up an acceptable 
standard for that element. The law of obscenity offers an analogous 
situation in which courts have had to work out a first amendment test 
for identifying material that is of no constitutional value. One of the 
elements of that test asks "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.,,150 As a recent 
decision makes clear, lSI this factor is not to determined by reference to 
local community standards. Instead, "[t]he proper inquiry is ... 
whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material, 
taken as a whole."152 
Drawing on the rationale for constitutional protection of speech, 
the nature of the tort claim being asserted, and the precedent in the 
obscenity context setting up a blend of local and national standards, a 
test for determining whether conduct is sufficiently extreme and outra-
geous to permit liability to be imposed could be incorporated into the 
emotional distress tort. This would separate the constitutionally per-
missible instances of liability from those situations in which liability 
would interfere too greatly with first amendment interests. 
The least complicated method of creating such a test simply 
would be to supplement the current "extreme and outrageous" com-
149. 376 u.s. 254, 278-80 (1964). 
150. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. IS, 24 (1973). 
151. Pope v. Illinois, \07 S. Ct. 1918 (1987). 
152. [d. at 1921. 
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ponent of the Restatement with a lack-of-social-value element. Under 
this approach to the issue, the only publication that would satisfy the 
test for liability would be a publication which was extreme and outra-
geous and which lacked serious social value. The introduction of the 
social value component as a check on the extreme and outrageous 
component serves to distinguish constitutionally valuable "speech that 
matters"153 from speech that has no such constitutional value. Phras-
ing the social value component in the negative, as this test does, carries 
with it an obligation for the plaintiff to prove the lack of value, and 
thus avoids the imposition of a formal burden of proof on the defend-
ant to justify the publication. 
The method of constitutionalization of the emotional distress 
claim offered here requires a plaintiff to prove that: 
1) the defendant acted with the intent to cause the plaintiff to suf-
fer severe emotional distress or with recklessness regarding such 
harm; and 
2) the defendant actually caused severe emotional distress, which 
rises to the level of a disabling interference with the plaintiffs nor-
mal functioning, and which has been proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence; and 
3) the defendant acted in a way that: 
a) can be characterized as extreme and outrageous,and 
b) either 
i) is predominantly speech that is directed to the plaintiff 
rather than speech about the plaintiff that is directed to a 
wider audience, 
or 
ii) is speech that lacks serious social value 
Using this enriched emotional distress claim, courts can adequately 
protect constitutionally valuable speech while still leaving open the 
possibility that victims of intentionally inflicted emotional distress are 
not precluded from recovery as a result of the introduction of a false 
statement of fact element that has no necessary relevance to the tort 
action. The revised test for liability offered here suggests that an alter-
native to the linear depictions of constitutional protection associated 
with the Sullivan line of cases (figure 1) and the Fourth Circuit's 
Falwell decision (figure 2) can now be drawn. Instead of viewing the 
constitution as encouraging all the speech up to a particular dividing 
line by extending protection beyond that line, the new test can be por-
trayed (see figure 3) as involving two circles, one that includes conduct 
that is extreme and outrageous, and another that includes speech that 
153. See supra note 147. 
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has serious social value. In those instances covered by the overlap of 
those two circles, the first amendment would be held to prohibit liabil-
ity, even though all the elements of the emotional distress tort claim 
may have been satisfied. 
v 
FIGURE 3. 
The Relationship Between the First Amendment 
and the Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress 
constitutionally 
protected 
speech 
with serious 
social value 
conduct 
intentionally 
inflicting 
severe 
emotional distress 
Depicted in this way, the test demonstrates that the relationship 
between the first amendment and the emotional distress claim is coin-
cidental rather than essential. In other words, the Constitution has no 
interest whatsoever in the emotionally distressing quality of speech. 
What is of concern is the social value attributed to that speech. View-
ing the tort claim and the social value of speech as separate spheres 
that sometimes overlap depicts the two subjects of the title of this arti-
cle in their proper relationship. The category of "this kind of speech" 
that was before the Court is now properly understood as constituting 
"speech with serious social value." For that reason, the speech is enti-
tled to first amendment protection from liability for the infliction of 
emotional distress. 154 
Application of the conduct element, as constitution ali zed in this 
way, to the facts of the Falwell case demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court reached the correct result in refusing to allow the plaintiff to 
recover. One could conclude that the conduct of the defendants, in 
publishing the remarks that went well beyond commentary on the 
154. The unsatisfactory nature of the Court's explanations for its construction of categories of 
speech is discussed in M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 301-10 (1988). The proposal outlined in the text of this article attempts to bring the 
publication involved in the Falwell case into a broad category of socially valuable speech, and resists the 
noti~n that further subcategorization of "this kind of speech" is likely either to reflect a principled 
distinction or to produce a manageable test. 
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plaintiff's public and professional life and included allegations of incest 
and drunkenness, were so far beyond what is tolerable in a civilized 
community as to qualify for the extreme and outrageous characteriza-
tion. Nevertheless, one could also conclude that the publication has 
serious social value on at least two levels. First, the ad parody does 
contain political or social commentary on Falwell's public role as a 
highly visible proponent of a particular brand of fundamentalist mo-
rality. Along with the more highly publicized statements about 
Falwell's sexual initiation with his mother, the publication contained 
statements purporting to claim that the only way Falwell could preach 
the message he put forth was if .he was drunk. The message that 
Falwell's preaching is so ridiculous that he could not do it sober is a 
commentary on public affairs that ought to be protected by the first 
amendment. Second, the ad parody falls into the category of humor. 
While it is certainly not to everyone's taste, and goes well beyond the 
standard of behavior acceptable in mo~t communities, the ad parody 
serves as a vehicle for provoking amusement by deflating the pompos-
ity associated with the plaintiff. For these reasons, even if the plaintiff 
were held to have suffered severe emotional distress, the Hustler ad 
parody could be located within the overlap of the two circles in Figure 
3, and thus protected from liability. ' . 
Applying the proposed test to the editorial cartoonist paradigm 
case that the Court found so troubling I 55 further demonstrates that the 
test has substantial merit as a means of protecting first amendment 
value. In most instances, a political cartoon would lie well within the 
social value circle and be located wholly outside of the emotional dis-
tress circle. However much a particular cartoon might deviate from a 
community's standard of decency, as long as the publication had social 
value, the plaintiff would be unable to satisfy the burden of proof on 
this element. An allegation that a cartoon lacks social value could be 
countered by evidence that focuses on such matters as the content of 
the cartoon, the overall content and mission of the publication in 
which the cartoon appears, and the general pattern of behavior of both 
the cartoonist and the publication printing it. That distinction be-
tween the creator (e.g., the cartoonist) and the republisher (e.g., the 
newspaper) is also important in those instances in which a decision to 
sue one but not the other comes into play. Because the newspaper is 
likely to have a greater ability to satisfy a judgment, it is a more likely 
target of litigation. Under the application of the social value compo-
nept of the test proposed here, because of its general social value, a 
155. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The cartoonist paradigm reflects the Court's con· 
cern that Falwell's recovery would open the door to liability for caustic political speech. 
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news or entertainment organization would not face a significant risk of 
liability for the publication of a cartoon that otherwise was character-
izable as extreme and outrageous in its treatment of the plaintiff. 
A final word needs to be said about the absence from the pro-
posed approach of a distinct element dealing explicitly with the public 
or private status of the plaintiff. Language in the Falwell opinion sug-
gests that it was the public figure status of the plaintiff combined with 
the absence of false statements of fact which produced a privilege to 
publish the ad parody. 156 Implicit in such an approach is a belief that 
public persons are forced to accept, under all conceivable circum-
stances, any injury inflicted by any nondefamatory speech. Rather 
than recognize a blanket protection for all nondefamatory speech 
about public plaintiffs, the position offered in this article suggests that 
it would be preferable to incorporate a consideration of the public or 
private status of the plaintiff into the determination of whether the 
communication about the plaintiff has serious social value. The pro-
posed test for serious social value also tracks the emerging strain in the 
Court's defamation precedent that makes constitutional protection 
contingent not just on the status of the plaintiff but also on the nature 
of the communication. 157 In most instances, the public status of a 
plaintiff will weigh heavily toward indicating that the communication 
has social value and thus is constitutionally protected. However, by 
. incorporating the status factor into the social value determination in 
this way, the possibility is left open that there could be a case in which 
there is intentionally harmful speech about a public person that does 
not fall into the category of "speech that matters"158 or "speech that 
involves a matter of public concern."159 Rather than dismiss that case 
out of hand by a per se rule of nonliability to public figure or public 
official plaintiffs, the revision of the emotional distress action proposed 
here is structured in such a way as to leave open the opportunity to 
deal with that contingency. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has put forward a modification of the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress that, in the end, produces the 
same result that was reached by the Supreme Court in the Falwell 
case. The question that probably needs to be answered is-why 
156. The Court's conclusion is stated as a limitation on 'recovery by "public figures and pU,blic 
officials." 108 S. Ct. at 882. 
157. See supra note 57. 
158. See supra note 147. 
159, See supra note 57. 
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bother? The justification for the approach offered in this article lies in 
a belief in the teaching role of the Supreme Court and in a sense that 
that role was poorly carried out in Falwell. 
Given the decision in Falwell, which rejected liability in the cir-
cumstances of that case but provided relatively little guidance for the 
resolution of future disputes, there appear to be,Jwo paths that could 
plausibly be taken. Proceeding along one path, courts could take a 
very expansive approach toward the holding of Falwell and virtually 
eliminate the intentional infliction of emotional distress action as an 
independent claim for relief. The steps along this path would include 
a broad characterization of an emotional distress claim as an illegiti-
mate alternative to a defamation claim, coupled with a widening scope 
for the Falwell decision so that the result is an absolute privilege from 
all liability for any speech that does not communicate false statements 
of fact about a plaintiff. 
The other path, the borders of which are sketphed out in this arti-
cle, would begin with a more careful delineation of precisely why the 
speech in the Falwell case is deserving of constitutional protection. 
That protection would then be layered on top of the existing elements 
of the tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, follow-
ing the model employed in other speech-tort contexts in the quarter-
century since the Sullivan decision. In this way, the emotional distress 
claim retains its viability to redress injuries that are inflicted on plain-
tiffs who ought not to suffer such harm without compensation. 
To recap the enriched emotional distress claim that emerges from 
the considerations developed in this article, a plaintiff who brings a 
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress for conduct 
that involves speech should face a more demanding set of elements 
than have previously been recognized. For a claim of that sort, the 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to cause 
the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress or with recklessness re-
garding such harm; that the defendant actually caused severe emo-
tional distress, which rises to the level of a disabling interference with 
the plaintiffs normal functioning, and which has been proven by clear 
and convincing evidence; and that the defendant acted in a way that 
can be characterized as extreme and outrageous, and either is 
predominantly speech that is directed to the plaintiff rather than 
speech about the plaintiff that is directed to a wider audience, or is 
speech that lacks serious social value. 
Adopting this enriched approach to the constitutionalization of 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress strikes a better balance 
between the tort claim and the first amendment than is suggested by 
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the Court's treatment of the issue in the Falwell case. Under this ap-
proach, all of the elements of the tort claim remain as prerequisites to 
liability. Additional showings are required of a plaintiff in order to 
prevent the tort claim from having too great a negative effect on first 
amendment interests, but those additional elements are tied directly to 
the purpose of that constitutional protection rather than grafted from 
the defamation context onto the emotional distress claim where they 
prove to be inappropriate. 
